CHECHENIAN
PHENOMENON
United States Army
Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA
The Caucasus Conflict and Russian Security:
the Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya
Part One, Section One: Military-Political Aspects of the Conflict
11-31 December 1994
by
Mr. Timothy Lee Thomas
January 1995
Note: This article is based on open source literature published in
the Russian press, and items broadcast on Russian radio and TV. Most, but
not all, of the reports are from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS). During the intervention, Russian government and Chechen sources
accused one another of placing disinformation in the press. This effort
does not aim to prove one point of view correct. It's aim is merely to
provide a framework and some logic for the events that have occurred and
their consequences.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE THREE- INTRODUCTION
PAGE FOUR- RUSSIAN RATIONALE FOR THE INTERVENTION
PAGE NINE- THE LEGAL CASE FOR INTERVENTION
PAGE TWELVE- COMMAND AND CONTROL
PAGE FIFTEEN- THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERVENTION
Part One: From Intervention to the Outskirts of
Grozny
(Military-Political Events from 11 December to
31 December)
"No territory has the right to leave Russia."
President Yeltsin on Russian TV, 27 December 1994
"Its good to be king."
Comedian Mel Brooks, The History of the World
As New Year's Eve approached, Russian military gun sights remained pointed
at the Presidential Palace of Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev. A showdown
awaited between Russia's finest, its airborne and marines, and the chiseled,
wily, and experienced freedom fighters and mercenaries of Chechnya. President
Boris Yeltsin and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev both had hoped for a quick
victory.
But the battle over the fate of the Presidential Palace began long before
this confrontation in the heart of Grozny. For the past three years Russian
and Chechen negotiators fought with one another over the fate of the republic
and each time the negotiations resulted in a stalemate. Meanwhile Russia,
troubled by many other issues, helplessly watched the situation in the
republic deteriorate and, in the opinion of the security services, become
a threat to Russian national security.
Finally losing his patience, Yeltsin decided to act. He initially utilized
the Dudayev-opposition among the Chechen population as his intermediary,
encouraging them to attack Dudayev's forces. Simultaneously, he tried to
surreptitiously support them with arms, training, and personnel. The result
was a blown secret or "black operation" that implicated the Russian Federal
Counterintelligence Service (FSK) and the Russian military as participants
in the operation.
His hand exposed, Yeltsin decided to play his ace and intervene with Russian
forces, a decision that quickly caused open dissension within the Russian
High Command. Initial results of the campaign supported those opposed to
the action. The intervention was conducted by poorly briefed officers who
were leading untrained conscripts unprepared for battle and backed by inadequate
rules of engagement (ROE) 1.
The officers and conscripts were met with smoldering hatred from many of
the republic's inhabitants, Chechen and Russian alike, and as a result
an already embattled and weakened President lost the support of long term
admirers and reformists, and won the undesired support of the Russian right
(in particular, Vladimir Zhirinovsky). Images of the Russian intervention
into Chechnya will influence the domestic, regional and international consequences
of Yeltsin's decision.
This paper's primary purpose is to serve as a preliminary historical assessment
and documentation of the events as they transpired, examining the intervention
through a discussion of the rationale for the action, the legal basis for
the action, command and control arrangements, force structure, strategy
and tactics of both sides, psychological operation issues, and officer
and soldier morale. Hopefully this discussion will provide analysts a synopsis
from which to develop a better understanding of how civil-military relations
worked (or did not work) during the action, the cooperation and problems
that arose among Yeltsin's praetorian guard (the Ministry of Defense [MOD],
MVD, and FSK), how both sides used psychological weapons, to include the
press, to their advantage, and how the intervention gradually escalated
into ruthless warfare on the streets of Grozny today and most likely into
the Caucasus mountains tomorrow. This could lead to a situation wherein
the Russian security services may have to remain in the area for years
and at best confront an environment of snipers and civilian resistance,
or at worst civil war.
This article on the subject of the Russian intervention into Chechnya is
divided into two parts. The first part covers military-political events
from 11-31 December (from the intervention to the arrival of Russian units
on the outskirts of Grozny). Part two of this article covers military activities
during the same period. Later, a second article will cover events in Chechnya
during the January-May timeframe.
Russian rationale for the intervention.
"The current situation threatens Russia's vital interests,
national security, territorial integrity, social stability and peace, legislators
emphasized." 2
The Russian Duma, 8 December 1994
Russians first appeared in the Caucausus region during the reign of Catherine
the Great, when Russia's most famous commander Alexander Survorov and Prince
Grigorii Potemkin led operations deep into the region. 3
It soon became clear to these and other military leaders that Russia needed
to bring ethnic elements on the northern side of the mountain range (and
desiring independence) under some type of Russian control. Otherwise, commanders
could not ensure the future security of lines of communication through
the region and beyond to the Black Sea.
General Aleksei Petrovich Ermolov, who had successfully fought against
Napoleon, later took steps to further this end, establishing a series of
fortresses along the so-called Caucasian Line. 4
This idea triggered alarm among the 50 or so ethnic groups in the area,
separated by language and the broken terrain of the Caucasus. Ermolov attempted
to coopt friendly villages and sought the destruction of those elements
that didn't cooperate. Scholar Firuz Kazemzadeh believes this contributed
to the transformation of the struggle into a "holy war."
In 1834, the religious title of Imam was assumed by the now infamous Shamil.
He took over the Chechen resistance and attempted to unify all Muslim tribes
against Russia. Russian forces assisted in the cohesion of the region by
offending local pride through the confiscation of weapons from native warriors.
A war ensued that, according to Russian General Rostislav A. Fadeev, tore
Chechnya from Russian hands and forced Russia to spend time restoring the
security of the Caucasian Line. Chechen resistance eventually altered Russian
strategy as well, forcing it to change from surgical incursions to sieges.
In 1859 Shamil was captured and Russia sent nearly 500,000 North Caucasians
to Turkey.
During the First World War, Chechens eventually sided with the Reds in
Russia and even aided in the restoration of Bolshevik power in the region.
As a reward the Chechen Oblast was formed in November 1922, and together
with the Ingush Oblast in 1936 formed the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic (ASSR). Overwhelmingly agrarian, the Chechens fought
the forcible reorganization of land, and in 1937-38 endured Stalin's purges
and the arrest of many local leaders.
The Second World War saw many non-Slavic, North Caucasian held German prisoners
of war exploited by the Nazis and used against the Soviet Union, buttressed
by the tradition of resistance to Russian rule in these peripheral regions.
Stalin later sought retribution and on 23 February 1944 charged Chechens
with betrayal of the Motherland and deported most of the 425,000 Chechens
and Ingushis. Khrushev re-established the Chechen-Ingush ASSR on 11 February
1957. The 1959 census showed Chechens totaled 419,000, and this number
grew to 611,000 by 1970. The ASSR included 135,000 Ingushis and 336,000
Russians in the republic as well. The Soviet government had, however, settled
enough Russians in the area to rearrange regional demographics. Renewed
ethnic tension was inevitable. As one scholar noted:
If the past is any indication of the future of Russo-Chechen
relations, the current conflict in Chechnya will not resolve the deep and
historic causes of dispute. Recurring Chechen resistance against Russian
domination is ample testament to the determination of the Chechens to break
free. No less apparent is the determination of the Russian government to
preserve the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation...the Chechen
case is far more significant than the tiny size of Chechnya would suggest.
If Russia yields in this instance, other minority republics in the North
Caucasus and elsewhere are apt to seize upon the precedent to demand their
own independence...hot pursuit of Chechen rebels may well drive them across
the frontiers of the Chechen Republic, thereby carrying the war into neighboring
republics... 5
Analysts studying the Russian rationale for intervening in Chechnya must
consider this historical background. It clarifies how both sides historically
legitimize their actions and perceptions of one another's motives.
Regarding the December 1994 intervention by Russian forces into Chechnya,
analysts should first consider the situation faced by the Yeltsin regime.
He was confronted with, in his opinion, an illegal government that had
failed to seriously negotiate over the course of the past three years.
At the same time, Chechnya had transformed itself into a center for terrorists,
criminals and drug kingpins, with many tied to the Chechen mafia.
Chechnya started its current revolution on 21 August 1991, two days after
the August coup in the former Soviet Union, and declared its independence
from Russia on 6 September 1991. A former Soviet Air Force General, Dzhokhar
Dudayev was invited to the post of president by the Amalgamated Congress
of the Chechen People from Estonia (where some Chechens were in exile).
Later, he was popularly elected and stated he wanted to free Chechnya from
Russia. Many Russians in the current regime considered the elections illegal
and therefore characterized Dudayev's presidency as illegitimate. 6
Russia's Fifth Congress of People's Deputies decreed the elections illegal
and Dudayev's regime unconstitutional. 7
Dudayev eventually, in the spring of 1993, dissolved the Chechen parliament,
and in June of 1993 his presidential guard clashed with those protesting
parliament's dissolution and killed nearly 50 people. By the latter half
of 1993, a Dudayev-opposition developed and initiated a small-scale guerrilla
war. By the spring of 1994 the Dudayev-opposition had called upon Russia
to support it and help establish constitutional order. This led to the
dismal attack in November of 1994 led by the Dudayev opposition and supported
by the Russian security services. 8
President Yeltsin, while addressing the Russian people for the first time
on 27 December about the intervention (more than two weeks after it had
started), underscored the illegitimacy of the Chechen leader. He stated
that :
elections of the Chechen President were held under conditions of essentially
martial law and only in certain districts of the then existing Chechen-Ingush
Republic.
the present leadership was not recognized either by the former legitimate
authorities of Chechnya or the federal authorities of the Russian Federation
or the world community.
the conclusion is that the regime is unlawful and has violated the fundamental
requirements of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, a position
first taken in 1991. 9
Yeltsin added that neither authorities nor law exist in Chechnya, only
armed units devoted to Dudayev. Sometimes bloody confrontation among armed
groups displaced political life, and divided Chechnya into zones, each
with its own leaders and illegal armed units:
The Grozny regime has used force to drive Chechen society down
the path of crime. The population of Chechnya has, in effect, been forced
to fend for itself. The republic's economy has been ruined. Law enforcement
has come to a halt. Violence and robbery have become everyday occurrences,
while arbitrariness has become the guiding principle of life. 10
The postal service has not functioned in Chechnya for a year
and a half. Communication lines are down. The amount in pensions alone
that is owed to the republic is 105 billion rubles. All funds earlier paid
out for these purposes were used by the Grozny leadership to buy weaponry. 11
Russian MVD chief Victor Yerin made it clear that his ministry was intent
on stopping the "orgy of violence" in Chechnya and that the use of force
was inevitable. Quoting statistics to support his case, Yerin noted that
in just eight months of 1994 nearly 1700 freight cars and containers were
plundered on the Grozny section of the North Caucasus Railroad. In addition,
the perpetrators of hundreds of criminal acts committed across the Caucasus
region found refuge on the republic's territory, and even terrorist groups
trained in Chechnya. Approximately one in three individuals prosecuted
for forgery in Russia hail from Chechnya, Yerin noted, and Chechen inhabitants
make up 42% of those involved in cases of embezzlement in the credit and
financial system.
While some Chechens were getting rich, the working population was leading
a life of semipoverty with no rights. Gangsters and criminals operated
unopposed and ruthlessly suppressed any resistance. Yerin noted that events
this fall showed that the criminal regime "was on the brink and would not
stop at mass violence against its own people in order to cling to power." 12
Yeltsin underscored this fact. He ended his TV address on 27 December by
stating that the Chechen situation exerted a destructive effect on the
stability of Russia, had become one of the main internal threats to the
security of the state, and therefore his intention was to rapidly restore
order in the republic in order to normalize life. Therefore the main mission
of the armed forces was to disarm bandit formations and collect or destroy
heavy weapons. 13
Leonid V. Smirnyagin, a member of Yeltsin's Presidential Council, considered
the time to be right for such an operation. He noted that Russia was now
intervening because "the situation is much better than two years ago."
He cited as evidence treaties with other Muslim regions, which ensured
calm in the area when Russian forces intervened. He also talked of the
emergence of a Russian ally in Georgia in place of an anti-Russian government
that had supplied Chechnya with arms. President Shevardnadze of Georgia
would ensure that no other mercenaries or arms would cross its borders
into Chechnya, The collapse of the Chechen economy during the tenure of
Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was slowly losing some of his popularity,
also figured in Smirnyagin's thinking. 14
Important individuals both within and outside the Russian government also
supported the intervention. One reason, of course, was the armed forces'
attempt to save face over the failed November attack. The FSK-supported
Chechen attack by the Dudayev-opposition in November not only was repulsed
and ended in failure but also implicated Russian military and FSK complicity,
which damaged both Yeltsin's and Grachev's credibility (the latter had
denied any support to the action at the time). Apparently Yeltsin's advisors
promised him a quick victory much like the U.S. action in Haiti. One correspondent
noted that the Armed Forces General Staff specialists tried to dissuade
Yeltsin from conducting army operations but failed. The view of the interior
troops command (a subordinate of the MVD) was more convincing and prevailed,
according to the same correspondent. 15
An interior troops commander, according to another account, called for
an intervention but specified that the army must lead it. 16
Minister of Defense Grachev, for his part, appeared overly optimistic.
In a now infamous statement, he was quoted by the press on 29 November
as stating that he could capture Grozny with "one airborne regiment within
two hours." 17 Yeltsin gave
the go ahead sign.
A second obvious reason for the intervention was offered by Foreign Minister
Andrey Kozyrev, who stated that a state has a right to use force to restore
law and order, and to eliminate a "free crime economy zone" on which bandit
gangs and the narcotics mafia based their existence. 18
He also said that the use of the army was allowed under the Code of Behavior
adopted at the recent CSCE Budapest summit. 19
This would allow Russian policy to prevent, in the first place, Chechnya
from breaking away and starting the "domino effect" in the region, and
to prevent the destruction of the territorial integrity of Russia. 20
Additional aims of the operation offered by others included: eliminating,
as Presidential Council member Dmitriy Volkogonov noted, the criminal sore
on the body of Russia; restoring some legitimacy to the Chechen leadership 21;
protecting the strategically significant railway lines and oil pipelines
that cross Chechnya 22; and
defending the welfare of Chechens and local Russians caught in an "inter-Chechen"
conflict (some, such as Grachev, were worried that the Chechens would use
the Russians as human shields).
Some very personal reasons of the Kremlin leadership for the intervention
were also cited. For example, some analysts predicted that Yeltsin's motivation
for intervening was to improve his reelection chances by demonstrating
resolve 23; while Grachev's
motivation was either to justify the renegotiation of the CFE flank limits
(due to the threat in the North Caucasus Military District), 24
to get more money for the military budget, 25
or to confirm Yeltsin's belief that he was the best defense minister "of
all times and peoples." 26
A goal of both of these men possibly was to take a stock of nuclear weapons
out of Dudayev's hands, a charge not substantiated anywhere but alluded
to by Dudayev himself (see section on PSYOP below). All of these goals
were obtainable in the event of a "victorious Blitzkrieg in Chechnya with
the subsequent lightning establishment of a dictatorship all over the country." 27
A final rationale for intervention requiring the closest attention was
that offered by Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeiko, who described
the operation as a "peacekeeping mission, to separate the warring sides,"
such as Russia is undertaking in CIS states. 28
Russian Presidential consultant to the President's analytical center, Arkady
Popov, felt that Russia may go to Chechnya as a "forcible peacekeeper",
to include disarming the two conflicting sides by introducing a limited
contingent of Russian troops. 29
Members of a parliamentary committee of North Ossetia, the Russian republic
bordering on Chechnya, noted that "the way from North Ossetia to Chechnya
can be open only for peacekeeping forces."
As a rationale for intervention, peacekeeping would have offered Yeltsin
a non-aggressive way to rationalize for entering Chechnya and rid it of
the arms and, over time, even the criminal elements that had bothered him
and the Russian state. The move may have received international sanction
and much less opposition from the Russian Parliament and public. If peacekeeping
was the actual intention of the Russian military buildup, that is to get
at Dudayev under the peacekeeping cover, the plan was ruined when Russian
military support of the opposition-backed assault was exposed.
The legitimization of the use of force according to basic criteria is
missing in these Russian efforts to rationalize the intervention. According
to western thinking associated with the use of force and conduct of an
operation, force can find legitimate use under the following criteria:
was an expected political-military end-state identified? What are the chances
of winning? Does the public understand the danger in the area and is public
opinion with U.S.? 30 Are
the actions in our national interest? The U.S. used to term this rationale
the "Weinberger Doctrine."
In June of 1994 one Russian general 31
conceded that Russian logic regarding the use of force in peacekeeping
operations was driven by criteria very similar to U.S. logic, except that
Russia always asked for the consent of both sides before intervening. Yet
Russian rationale for the intervention appears to have ignored some of
the most important of these criteria, or at least has failed to answer
these questions to the public's satisfaction. The Russian government appeared
to look at this problem in a hasty manner (due to the failure of the "black
operation?") through the prism of threats and interests without prior serious
analysis of possible end-states, chances of winning quickly, or the state
of public opinion, to cite but a few of the criteria.
A disjointed operation resulted, one beset by problems from the start that
contain the seeds of Yeltsin's decline in political power. Another of Yeltsin's
advisors, Emil Pain, correctly said he "feared the political battle in
Moscow over Chechnya more than the Russian military's entry into the Caucasus."
Owing to the lack of an identifiable end-state and a disastrous public
relations campaign on the radio and TV (some felt public relations campaigns,
due to content, were worse than German propagandist Josef Goebbel's World
War II campaigns), Pain's warning looks increasingly on the mark from the
perspective of Yeltsin's political opposition and anti-Yeltsin public opinion.
The Legal Case for Intervention
"This is not the irony of history, but its vengeance: the Russian
president marked the first anniversary of the Russian Constitution with
the bombardment of Russian inhabited localities and a tank parade in the
republics of the Northern Caucasus."
Stepan Kiselyon, deputy Editor-in-Chief of Moscow News
In the military newspaper Red Star, on 14 December 1994, President
Yeltsin issued an appeal (dated 11 December 1994). It listed as the reason
for the intervention into Chechnya "a threat to the integrity of Russia
and to the safety of its citizens both in Chechnya and beyond its boundaries,
and by the possibility of a destabilization of the political and economic
situation. Our objective is to find a political solution to the problems
of one of the subjects of the Russian Federation-the Chechen Republic-and
to protect its citizens against armed extremism." 32
On 9 December the Russian government had issued a Presidential decree "On
Measures to Halt the Activity of Illegal Armed Formations on the Territory
of the Chechen Republic and in the Zone of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict."
Citing Part 5 of Article 13 of the Constitution, the edict noted that "actions
aimed at violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining
the security of the state, establishing armed formations, and inciting
national and religious discord are prohibited in the territory of Russia
and are outside the law." Yeltsin, on the basis of Article 80 of the Constitution,
decreed:
1. That the Government of the Russian Federation be entrusted
in accordance with points "d" and "e" of Article 114 of the Constitution
of the Russian Federation with the use of all the means available to the
state to guarantee national security, legality, the rights and freedoms
of citizens, the preservation of public order, and the fight against crime
and with the disarmament of all illegal armed formations.
2. That the present edict goes into effect on the day of its
publication.
[signed] B. Yeltsin
Moscow, the Kremlin
9 December 1994 33
Yeltsin's use of the Constitution and bypassing of Parliament and the Constitutional
Court was underscored in news coverage of the edict. Moscow News
(MN) Deputy Editor-in-Chief Stepan Kiselyov, commenting on the Constitutionality
of the action, wrote that eighteen months ago MN noted "what we have in
front of us [referring to the Constitution] is the Fundamental Law of an
authoritarian state capable of trampling on all the other laws." While
the Russian electorate was aware of the dangers with which the Constitution
was filled, they chose it over the Zhirinosvsky (who has supported the
Constitution), national-patriotism, and communism as well as "the Zorkins
and Khasbulatovs disobeying Yeltsin." 34
Russian authorities initially decided to declare a "State of Emergency
Decree" in Chechnya. Yelena Mizulina, deputy chairman of the Constitutional
Legislation and Legal Issue Committee, said a State of Emergency decree
was possible and that the President could legally impose it without the
Federation Council's (upper house of Parliament) consent. Mizulina said
that under the Emergency Situation Act the president can use the armed
forces to cope in emergency situations. When challenged that this was a
political and not military emergency, Mizulina quoted an article of the
act stating that emergencies may handle natural or technological disasters,
and that Chechnya falls into the former category. 35
In the end authorities backed off their initial intention and decided not
to implement the State of Emergency decree. Parliament saw Chechnya as
a deep trap into which they did not want to fall.
Presidential Aide Georgi Satarov noted on Russian TV on 12 December that
there are specific reasons why a State of Emergency decree was not issued
and why the Russian armed forces and MVD are serving together in Chechnya.
According to Satarov, under a State of Emergency, only MVD troops can be
used. Since the MVD is not equipped to battle forces with heavy artillery
and tanks, a State of Emergency seemed inappropriate to handle the situation
in Chechnya. President Yeltsin therefore referred to Chechnya as an armed
conflict zone, which is a zone where Defense Ministry troops may be used. 36
Satarov said this was the legal basis for the use of the armed forces in
Chechnya and explains why Grachev's forces legally are deployed in the
region.
Izvestia reporter Valeriy Vyzhutovich reported, however, that until
the State of Emergency was initiated in Chechnya it was impermissible to
create an interim organ of government. The introduction of a territorial
administration in the Chechen Republic before this happened was unconstitutional. 37
Meanwhile Yeltsin and his staff were busy preparing the groundwork for
this to happen. On 20 December Rossiyskaya Gazeta published Yeltsin's
edict and statute on the Russian Federation President's fully empowered
representative in the Chechen Republic. 38
At the same time President Dudayev, interviewed by the Italian press, served
notice that nothing the Russians had done had intimidated him, to include
the Presidential decree. He noted that independence is not an end in itself,
but rather there are principles "that do not allow a whole people to live
in the image and likeness of another..., not that of the Russians." 39
Tamaz Abubakarov, head of the Chechen delegation negotiating with the Russians
in Vladikavkaz and Minister of Economics and Finance, said that while there
are common meeting grounds the sides differ on "the ways and methods to
achieve their goals." The Presidential decree, in his opinion, did not
provide a mechanism for confiscating weapons. He said Chechens would agree
to disarm only if Russian troops would leave Chechen territory. 40
Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergey Yushenkov, who talked with Dudayev's
aide several times, said Dudayev had agreed to talk about a referendum
and elections, even pre-term elections, but on one condition, that troops
be withdrawn. 41 Chechen
Foreign Minister Shamseddin Yusef, however, told INTERFAX that talks in
Vladikavkaz "under Moscow's pressure" were made pointless by the Russian
intervention. 42
A final factor working against any Russian attempt at mediation was the
fact that while talking with Dudayev's people Russia simultaneously held
separate talks with the Dudayev-opposition, the group it had supported
with arms, training, and men in the November attack on Grozny. As a result,
Russian mediation was not considered impartial or credible by the Chechens
but rather condescending. Thus the stage was set for a bloody confrontation.
Once the confrontation started and numerous fatalities occurred among the
civilian population, Sergey Kovalev, President Yeltsin's Human Rights Commissioner,
testified that he witnessed mass violations of human rights. He added that
the matter had ceased being an internal affair of the Russian state or
any other state, judging by international norms. Kovalev added that since
Russia takes that position at conferences such as the U.N. Human Rights
Commission, it should adopt it now. 43
For the future, the Russian Security Council's legal basis for the justification
and procedure for implementing the intervention will continue to have an
impact throughout the Federation, as other republics ask if Yeltsin may
decide to eliminate armed groups on their territory under the same rationale.
The question of "what to do about the lack of parliamentary and constitutional
court oversight over the president and his use of the constitution?" will
receive serious attention and will undoubtedly have some impact on the
upcoming Russian elections. Once agains, Yeltsin ignored Parliament, and
his attack on the rebellious region of Chechnya will impair Federalism.
Command and Control.
The Russian decision-maker for the Chechen intervention was the Russian
Security Council. It began as and has remained the political command and
control element of the operation. Initially Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
was in charge of the operation. As Izvestiya announced on 15 December:
As soon as the president's ultimatum was announced, the headquarters
for coordinating all action in the republic was secretly set up, headed
by V. Chernomyrdin. An Interim Information Center was then created. After
the troops went into Chechnya, operational leadership of the military-political
operation in the North Caucasus was given to first Vice premier O. Soskovets. 44
First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets created an operations center to coordinate
the activity of the federal organs of executive power in Moscow. Faced
with the threat of possible terrorism all over Russia by groups of people
of Chechen nationality, the center has monitored the protection of important
installations, security, the observance of the legality and rights of its
citizens, and maintenance of public order everywhere except Chechnya itself.
Within the Duma, an operational headquarters was established and headed
by Valentin Kovalev. 45 This
governmental agency, of course, does not belong to the President as the
Security Council does.
On the territory of Chechnya, Russian Nationalities Minister Nikolay Yegorov,
by Yeltsin's edict now a deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation
and the extraordinary presidential representative in Chechnya, coordinated
the actions of the "power" structures, that is the elements of the Armed
Forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Federal Counter-intelligence
Service which are subordinate to him under Yeltsin's edict. Vyacheslav
Mikhaylov, another deputy chairman, provided backup for the negotiating
process between the federal authorities and the warring sides in Chechnya.
The refugee and other humanitarian problems were handled by Sergey Shoygu,
Minister of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, responsible for handling
affairs associated with civil defense, emergency situations, and natural
disasters. 46
Yegorov proved not a popular appointee. Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee
for Defense, Sergey Yushenkov, called Yegorov "one of the initiators of
and those to blame for the latest events in Chechnya, and his promotion
was evidence that the activities recently carried out in Chechnya are planned
to be expanded." 47 Another
source called Yegorov the "advocate of war in the North Caucasus." 48
It was soon apparent, in spite of the appointments of Chernomyrdin, Soskovets,
and Yegorov, that these civilians were unable to provide sound explanations
about what tasks were set before Russian troops in Chechnya, what the overall
operation looked like, and what they could do about it. Soskovets, according
to government circles, found it hard to keep control over the operation.
It appeared to many observers that the military, under the guise of military
secrecy or "need to know" had taken control of the entire operation. As
one correspondent wrote:
The editorial office [Izvestia's] has information to the effect
that by early September, long before decisive action against Chechnya began,
the experts who had earlier taken part in analyzing and forecasting events
in the republic had stopped getting operational information. The question
arises-why did the military require total secrecy? The explanation should
really be sought in the fact that the military initially decided to assume
the role of politicians in the Chechen crisis [underlining not in original]. 49
Presidential Council member Smirnyagin expanded on the problem of military
supremacy over the operation. He foresaw a danger in the fact that not
only the power (security) ministries could assume the function of shaping
immediate political tasks but also field commanders, who were starting
to operate autonomously. 50
If true, this explanation would offer an explanation as to why fighting
and bombing continued after Yeltsin's decree to stop it. This assumes extremely
weak command and control over military units which is difficult to fathom
in a conflict as centralized as Chechnya.
Co-Chair of the Democratic Russian Party, Galina Starovoitova, noted that
"on the whole we must draw the conclusion about the absence of any mechanism
of civilian control over military structures in our society. This is a
consequence of the refusal to appoint a civilian defense minister in Russia.
Absolute impotence has been demonstrated by the highest legislative body
of authority-the Federal Assembly-which has been deprived of any serious
information whatsoever." 51
Speaking specifically about the military, Grachev himself noted that on
29 November the Security Council had appointed him to lead a group that
included the Russian power ministers to settle the conflict. 52
This point was confirmed in the 7 December edition of Red Star,
the Russian Armed Forces newspaper, which stated that the appointment of
Grachev to lead the group was confirmed by a special decree of the Russian
president. 53 That is, Grachev
had overall control of the operation from the Security Council's viewpoint
and informed Soskevets and Yegorov of the progress of the operation. This
informal arrangement was a type of interagency group to control the conflict.
It was insufficient to do so, and resulted in civilians getting the blame
for a situation over which it had little or no control. The military, on
the other hand, looked like the gang that couldn't shoot straight.
The Caucasus Military District, under the command of Colonel-General Alexei
Mityukin, was in apparent operational charge of the operation on the ground
at the start of the conflict. 54
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Counterintelligence
Service (FSK), and an operational group from the Russian General Staff
supported him. The General Staff group included officers of the Main Operational,
Main Intelligence, and Main Organizational-Mobilization administrations.
Either Yeltsin, Yegorov, or Grachev, after witnessing some initial failures,
decided to purge the top military commanders in charge of operations in
Chechnya. Grachev first offered the operation to the Deputy Ground Forces
Commander, Colonel-General Edward Vorobyev, who refused to take command,
and so Grachev reportedly took over direct command of the campaign himself.
TASS reported that all together six commanders had been dismissed for "indecisiveness
and inaction" at a meeting of the senior armed forces leadership in Mozdok
but only gave details of five dismissals. Grachev purportedly sacked the
entire top leadership of the North Caucasus army group -- Colonel-General
Alexei Mityukin, his first deputy Lieutenant-General Vladimir Chirindin
and chief of staff Lieutenant-General Vladimir Potapov.
TASS also reported that Grachev told First Deputy Defense Minister Georgy
Kondratyev and Deputy Ground Troops Commander Eduard Vorobyov to resign. 55
The latter two generals were specifically responsible for peacekeeping
operations, the former at the ministry level and the latter at the ground
force headquarters level. A later Itar-Tass report stated that General
Valeriy Tretyakov would replace Mityukhin as the leader of the North Caucasus
Military District, and named General Leongiy Shevtsov as chief of staff
of the district, and a General Kvashnin was appointed as first deputy commander
of troops. 56 Only two hours
later, yet another ITAR-TASS press release reported that an MOD official
described reshuffling in the leadership of the operation as "disinformation
aimed at destabilizing the situation in the North Caucasus." 57
Grachev later announced that he had sacked none of the generals but had
retained control of the operation himself and continued in this position
through at least New Year's day.
The problem for Western analysts with this command and control scenario
is that it practically ignores the role of the General Staff. According
to Russia's national security policy, the General Staff is the operational
arm of the Security Council. Since all indications are that it is the Security
Council and Minister of Defense that are running the operation, what has
happened to the General Staff? What support are they providing to Grachev
and the Security Council? This is the missing key to the answer to many
of the questions about military operations, to include issues of competence
and discipline, in Chechnya. The Chief of the General Staff, General Kolesnikov,
has virtually not appeared either physically or in the press since the
operation began.
The presence of General Colin Powell, Kolesnikov's U.S. counterpart, during
Desert Storm was a constant reminder that the military-political and General
Staff equivalent (the Joint Staff) link was never broken among General
Schwarzkopf, Secretary of Defense Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Colin Powell and the President. The absence of Kolesnikov is very
disturbing from this point of view, since it implies serious problems between
the Minister of Defense and General Staff.
The Consequences of the Intervention
Throughout the initial weeks of the operation that led to the New Year,
the vast majority of Yeltsins's advisors and political appointees did all
they could to put a positive spin on events in Chechnya. Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev, for example, listed four achievements. First, the source
of danger posed by the situation in Chechnya was localized and isolated.
Second, the Dudayev regime was delegitimized. Third, armed gangs were severed
from the outside world. Finally, Dudayev's forces no longer will perpetrate
lawless deeds with impunity. 58
However, people beyond the closed circle of the Security Council, of which
Kosyrev is a member, had a more negative view of the events in Chechnya.
For example, it is naive to believe that the participation of foreign mercenaries
on the territory of Chechnya will go unnoticed by Russia. Their participation
most likely will complicate Russia's relations with the mercenary's native
countries in the future. For purposes of this article, more negative aspects
of the intervention are divided into domestic, regional and international
consequences.
Domestic. Perhaps in the long run some of the factions and interest groups
that spoke out so strongly against Yeltsin's decision will approve of them.
But one thing is for sure: Yeltsin's decision in the short run has threatened
to destroy his relationship with the reformist groups in Moscow, especially
with his former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and other democracy and human
rights advocates; to alienate parts of the Russian military, particularly
within the High Command; and has threatened to strengthen the credibility
of Russia's nationalist extremists. 59
Political support was against Yeltsin from the start of the intervention,
as Russia's Choice, Yabloko, the Party of Russian Unity and Concord, the
Democratic Party of Russia, the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party, and
Women of Russia opposed his decision. Only Vladimir Zhirinovsky's Liberal
Democratic Party and three other groups of deputies, the Russian National
Unity Party, the nationalist Russian Path, and the Liberal Democratic 12
December Union approved of the invasion. 60
Besides a lack of political support, the intervention undermined confidence
in democratic institutions. In order to maintain power in the face of the
strong opposition to his decision, Yeltsin may resort to invoking a moratorium
on elections, which will further enrage the opposition.
One State Duma deputy, Vladimir Lysenko, stated that Yeltsin cannot invoke
an authoritarian regime even if he wanted because the country now lacks
support for authoritarianism (such as ideology, apparatuses, and power
structures of the kind needed). He noted that the President's action in
Chechnya was rejected by the majority of the country's population (60%
of the population was against the intervention). Lysenko added that there
is a crisis of political leadership at the democratic flank and at the
center of the political spectrum that is growing. Divisions within the
political elite continue, but they are not over market problems or orientation
toward the West, but rather over power and property ownership. The question
raised again in Russia is "what kind of authoritarian regime will assert
itself in Russia, a centralized or a decentralized one?" Even regional
elites may now actively oppose any attempt to return to a unitary state
and instead try to uphold a strengthening of authoritarian foundations
at the regional level (holding no elections, ignoring representative power
bodies, and so on). 61
The Army's fate is the most complicated and controversial since so much
depends on the Kremlin's internal politics after the intervention, and
on Yeltsin's personal relationship with Grachev and the other power ministers.
During the initial fighting, it was often difficult to ascertain if Yeltsin
controlled the military or vice versa. Military secrecy kept many issues
in the hands of the military from the start of the operation, and combined
with the lack of civilian control of the military through the Parliament,
it is little wonder that people questioned who was in charge. A more chilling
point is that whether democracy or nationalism survives is not as important
for the current power ministers as whether Yeltsin survives. If he does
not, then wholesale changes will take place at the upper echelons of these
institutions.
From the beginning the Russian leadership denied that it was losing army
support due to the developments in Chechnya. However, initial problems
with morale and open splits in the military leadership, even at its highest
levels, combined with dislike within the High Command for Minister of Defense
Grachev, make loss of support for the leadership's decision to intervene
believable. If true, then many military men are looking for a new political
leadership to follow.
The army could benefit or lose from the intervention. On the one hand,
they could receive new budget allocation from the Duma and get more money
for equipment, training, and social care. Undoubtedly the armed forces
will need money. Reformist economist Grigory Yavlinsky estimated military
costs to be one trillion rubles ($290) a month just to cover operations. 62
How much the Duma will grant is another matter. Yegor Gaidar noted that
if Russia has more conflicts such as Chechnya with similar costs it "will
need another kind of military spending, a remilitarized economy, broader
powers of the police to oppose terror, and the freedom of the press will
be curtailed." 63 Spending
money on the military will keep the country backward, another analyst warned,
since a protracted guerilla war could cost 10 trillion rubles a year which
is enough to renovate and modernize the coal industry or increase the populations
buying power. He further implied that since the defense industry couldn't
get budget funding in 1995, a military solution to the Chechen crisis became
the only way for the military-industrial complex to "get around its production
problems." 64 This hardly
sounds like a reasonable solution for military research and development,
since budget restrictions will limit military spending as much as the low
tech war in Chechnya.
On the other hand, the Army may also suffer a serious setback in morale
and internal cohesion due to their poor performance and loss of key leaders.
Army leaders must insure that the split in the upper ranks of the army
that resulted in the rumored dismissal of three deputy ministers of defense
does not spread and involve other top ranking officers. This situation
is extremely sensitive. It is important to note that the army could move
beyond the control of the politicians. If, for example, the leaders of
military districts decide to side with local politicians, the army could
split along regional lines. Or, if opinion polls are correct, certain army
leaders, such as General Lieutenant Alexander Lebed, who possesses charisma
and a solid reputation among many Russians, may attempt a political career,
maybe in or maybe out of uniform. This is a time of special danger for
the armed forces. They will watch the Duma closely in the coming months,
and vice versa.
Russian authorities will also review how the armed forces, FSK, and MVD
worked together. The operation in Chechnya was disjointed at first and
often found one security service blaming the other or carrying out roles
not normally expected of it. Ingush President Ruslan Aushev, a Hero of
the Soviet Union for his war exploits in Afghanistan, said the campaign
was carried out incompetently, stressing there "was no coordination between
the paratroops, interior ministry forces, and regular troops. They have
no clear orders and no idea what they're doing." 65
Equally ominous is the fact that Grachev's reform and his desire to transform
the army into a mobile force have had some organizational success but still
appear to need much work in the theory of fighting a local conflict or
operation other than war. The armed forces appeared ready to fight yesterday's
war in Chechnya (and perhaps this is why some commanders refused to lead,
that is they did not know how to conduct a local conflict but only a large
scale one on the plains of Europe). Analysts must ask, what did the armed
forces learn from Afghanistan? With no NCO corps, inadequate training for
regular let alone urban combat, and a demoralized force, the army's performance
can be rationalized. However, the end result can only enhance the popularity
of generals Lebed and Gromov, and will certainly discredit Grachev and
ultimately Yeltsin.
One final consequence is that the army may have found a new rationale for
its presence and action on Russian territory. Minister of Defense Grachev
noted that the army may remain in Chechnya permanently, and MVD chief Yerin
stated that the success of this operation will give assurance to many other
regions of Russia that "we will not let them get into a state in which
Chechnya has found itself." 66
It is hard to believe that the other Russian republics will consider this
good news.
The lack of trust in democracy and army problems aside, perhaps the most
serious political outcome of the intervention is that extremist views may
take precedence over reformist views. Calls for a Greater Russia play into
the extremists hands, and these calls gained a new following during the
crisis. As Lysenko noted:
The extreme nationalist opposition, having supported the President's
actions in Chechnya, at the same time advocate a more consistent and tougher
enforcement of order...There is a great danger of these forces shifting
their political positions from the state idea (which so far agitates the
population in the social, not geographic or political, sense) to the ethnic
(or religious) idea of setting Russians against non-Russians, and the Orthodox
against the Muslims. 67
Lysenko added that fertile soil exists to advance the national idea in
Russia on an ethnic instead of a state basis, and to advance the ideas
of Russian fascism. As an example, some 32% of respondents to a recent
poll stated that the rights of Russians in the Russian Federation are infringed
more than those of other ethnic groups. Zhirinovsky's showing in the vote
in December 1993 was based on his "defending Russians and upholding a new
order," for those who have forgotten. Many Russians, after the Chechen
problem, do not regard those now in power as democrats, yet most (60%)
want a democratic country and not a dictatorship led by the national idea.
Therefore, the country must replace the current team with new democrats
while it can, in the opinion of many, if democracy is to survive. 68
Former Presidential Ethnic Affairs Adviser Galina Starovoitova, currently
co-chairman of Democratic Russia, said that the intervention will "produce
mistrust of the center's policy and centrifugal tendencies in Tatarstan,
Bashkortostan, Takutia, Karelia, and other parts of the Russian Federation."
These tendencies could play into the nationalists' hands. A number of Russian
republics were against the use of force in Chechnya. For example, the Republic
of Buryatia said the developments in Chechnya threaten the integrity of
Russia. Karelia "denounces the involvement of the army in the solution
of internal problems of Russia." Chuvashin's State Council believed it
"inadmissible to use the Russian Army in conflicts against civilian populations
and to restore constitutional lawfulness in Chechnya." The Chelyanbinsk
region and Murmansk supported the government. 69
Regional. For the long term, the impact of Yeltsin's decision
on regional stability is hard to determine. The short term impact is already
clear in that Chechnya made requests to foreign governments and was supported
with men, material, and other types of assistance, thereby decreasing stability.
The conflict could spark an urge to move away from Moscow's authority and
democracy, and threatens to undermine peace efforts in other parts of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It also will cast doubt on Moscow's
ability to play a role in settling conflicts between or among Islamic states.
Emil Pain, the current Ethnic Affairs Adviser on the Presidential Council
to Yeltsin, said the North Caucasus on the whole was quiet. Leaders of
other republics in the region, however, were not as reassuring. Kalmyk
President Kirsan Ilyumzhinov told Interfax that his republic, "situated
too closely to the region," may become engulfed in the conflict. The Confederation
of the Peoples of the Caucasus, asked by Chechnya to form a regional alliance
"from the Caspian to the Black Sea" to resist the Russian intervention,
agreed and thereby added to the destabilization. The President of the Confederation,
Ali Aliev, warned on Russian TV that he had issued instructions for setting
up offices to induct volunteers in Dabardo-Balkaria, Adygei, Ingushetia,
Dagestan, Abkhazia, and North Ossetia. In Azerbaijan, the opposition Grey
Wolves party told Interfax on 14 December that about 270 Grey Wolves had
volunteered to go to Chechnya. 70
Other freedom fighters arrived from Ukraine, Pakistan and Jordan, among
other countries. Those arriving from Ukraine perhaps posed the greatest
potential future problem, especially concerning the fate of the Crimea.
According to William Conner, a U.S. expert on Ukraine, on 12 December 1994
the Ukrainian government officially stated that Chechnya is an internal
Russian Federation affair, stressing its "adherence to the principles of
territorial integrity and exclusively peaceful solutions to any disputes."
The Ukrainian government further warned Ukrainian organizations and citizens
not to interfere. Later, the Ukrainian Foreign ministry downplayed comparisons
between Chechnya and Crimea and warned citizens against travel to Chechnya.
By 21 December, President Leonid Kuchma stated that he had ordered government
authorities to take an active role to stop Ukrainian citizens from participating
in Chechnya. He did, however, express concern about escalation of the conflict
and civilian casualties. The latter statements followed accusations by
the Russian government that external forces, including mercenaries from
Ukraine and other countries, had participated in the Chechen conflict with
the Chechens.
There were, however, other reactions from Ukrainian bodies. Rukh condemned
Russian actions in Chechnya on 12 December 1994, and the Ukrainian Republican
Party sent a letter protesting the Russian intervention and actions in
Chechnya to the Russian ambassador to Ukraine the same day. By 20 December
1994, the Ukrainian Parliament had weighed in against the casualties and
bloodshed in the operation, and the Ukrainian Democratic Party issued a
protest against the Russian action, encouraging support of the Chechens.
More virulent were the words and actions of the Crimean Tatars and the
Ukrainian National Self-Defense Organization (UNSO), the illegal paramilitary
arm of the recently-legalized Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA). As early
as 11 December, UNSO held a rally in Kiev attended by representatives from
the Ukrainian Democratic Party, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists,
and the Ukrainian Republican Party, during which word of Russian tank movements
on Grozny was received. By 30 December 1994, UNSO admitted having approximately
20 members in Chechnya, while in Moscow, Russian Minister of Defense displayed
what he claimed was a hat from a Ukrainian fighter in Chechnya, calling
them "Banderites." 71
The Crimean Tatars reported that 10 members had already gone to Chechnya
on 12 December 1994, and the leader of the Crimean Tatar group in Crimea's
Supreme Soviet drew a parallel between Russia's action in Chechnya and
Ukraine's problems with the Crimean Republic.
One may characterize the Ukrainian government actions as very low profile
during this period, declaring their intent to keep Ukrainians out of Chechnya,
and non-governmental organizations which have sent volunteers to Chechnya
to fight with the Chechens have not sent many. Moreover, the quantity of
those from Ukraine appears no more than 100, from various sources rather
from any one group and probably much less than those from other countries,
and the figures cited have not been confirmed independently. The use by
the Crimean Tatars of the Chechnya example for the Crimean Republic government,
however, is ominous, as is the postponement of Russo-Ukrainian negotiations
on interstate agreements.
Vladimir Lysenko, in commenting on regional consequences of the conflict,
stated that averting a national war is not possible if Russian Cossacks
appear in Chechnya. A great explosion would occur in Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
and other republics. A "Yugoslavization" of the conflict will result with
everybody fighting everybody else, in Lysenko's opinion. 72
Existing Russian paramilitary groups would capitalize as well on such a
situation, and they are under no one's control.
Another effect of the fighting was on peace operations in the region. In
mid-December, according to Major General Vasiliy Yakushev, Commander of
the Russian peacemaking forces in the area of conflict between Georgia
and Abkhazia, a rally was held in Abkhazia to condemn Russian policy and
to recruit volunteers for Chechnya. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Georgiy
Kondratyev, during a visit a week later, asked Abkhazian Defense Minister
Sultan Sosnaliyev if it was worth Russian lives put on the line to defend
Abkhazians from Georgians, if Abkhazians on the side of the Chechens were
killing Russian servicemen? Where was the logic in this, Kondratyev demanded?
Thus the Russian leadership will review its position on this issue and
other CIS peacekeeping missions as well in the near future.
Finally, separate countries in the region friendly to the Dudayev regime
were asked for diplomatic support. Dudayev, for example, asked Turkey to
mediate the conflict, and the Turkish foreign ministry responded by saying
that "Turkey was the first to express its concern at the government level
about the dispute in Chechnya and the need for a peaceful solution," concerns
that appear warranted. 73
Reports said Turkey earlier had agreed to grant Dudayev asylum in the so-called
"Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus." This arrangement was discussed in
October of this year. 74
International. There were international consequences for Russia
as well. Many countries in the West and in Asia initially stated that the
affair was an internal Russian one and there was little apprehension on
the part of these governments. Later, however, many countries and organizations,
to include the Economic Community and Organization on Security and Cooperation
in Europe, called for a halt to the fighting (especially the bombing of
innocent civilians) and directed concern toward protection of basic human
rights. Even long time ally and friend Cuba voiced concern, saying that
it regretted that negotiations have not worked so far and that it wanted
a solution that put an end to the situation running counter to the legitimate
interests of Russian people. 75
Concern over Russian internal stability also concerned the international
community. The threat of Chechen terrorism against Russian nuclear centers
or other environmental objectives made the world uneasy. Any nuclear, biological
or chemical incident engineered by the Chechens against the Russians could
easily affect nations as far away as Africa.
Finally, Russia's weak military display may invoke confidence in certain
other powers in the region if they were to confront Russia. This is not
good for the region or for the world. China, for example, could have found
relief in Russia's weakness knowing that they won't be attacked. Or, they
may have found a motive to initiate an attack or offensive in the Far East
or to seize part of Kazakhstan due to internal ethnic problems in Russia.
ENDNOTES
1. Press reports indicate that the Russian military
initially engaged in extremely limited aggressive action. When faced with
mobs, one report says, neither smoke pots nor the notorious 'cheremukha'
(riot gas) were used. Troops could have acted more resolutely if they wanted,
the report added. See Leonid Smirnyagin, "Initial Task Fulfilled Successfully
by Troops," Krasnaya Zvezda, 20 December 1994, p 1, as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-244, 20 December 1994, p 6. General Lieutenant Stanislav
Kavun, Deputy Commander of the MVD's Internal Troops, said his soldiers
were constrained by certain restrictions on the active use of weapons,
and this led to a number of deaths early in the intervention. See Stanislav
Kavun, "Our Aim is to Disarm the Armed Bandits," Rossiyskiye Vesti,
23 December 1994 p 1, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-247, 23 December 1994,
p 14.BACK
2. ITAR-TASS 8 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-237,
9 December 1994, p 20.BACK
3. This short historical sketch is based on an article
by Robert F. Bauman entitled "Historical Perspective on the Conflict in
Chechnya", which Dr. Bauman wrote for the journal Low Intensity Conflict
and Law Enforcement. It will appear in the ? issue.BACK
4. This line marked the southern limit of Russian military
outposts and settlements.BACK
5. Bauman, pp 17,18.BACK
6. "Chechnya," Moscow News, December 16-22, 1994,
No. 50, p 1, 2.BACK
7. Valeriy Vyzhutovich, "Chechnya Will Spurn Kremlin's
Representatives," Izvestiya, 20 December 1994, p 2, as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-244, p 19.BACK
8. "Chechnya," Moscow News, December 16-22, 1994,
No. 50, p 1, 2.BACK
9. ITAR-TASS 1140 GMT, 27 December 1994, as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994, p 25.BACK
10. Ibid.BACK
11. Ibid., p 27.BACK
12. Vladimir Klimov, "The Use of Force was the Only
Measure Capable of Halting the Orgy of Crime," Rossiyskaya Gazeta,
24 December 1994, p 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994
p 36. By 13 December 21 investigating field groups of Russian MVD law enforcement
officer , 1000 special purpose troops to police railroads were in Chechnya.
See INTERFAX 13 December 1994 as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-240, 14 December
1994, p 15.BACK
13. Ibid., Yeltsin TV address.BACK
14. Moscow TV 12 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-239,
13 December 1994, p 16.BACK
15. Dmitriy Muratov, "The Country's Incumbent leadership
will be put on Trial for the Reckless Adventure in Chechnya," Novaya
Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 14 December 1994 p 1, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-241,
15 December 1994, p 40.BACK
16. Dmitriy Muratov, "Provocations and Casualties are
being Planned," Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 3 December 1994, p
1 as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-233, 5 December 1994, p 30.BACK
17. Moscow RIA, 29 November 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-235A,
7 December 1994, p 13.BACK
18. ITAR-TASS 15 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-241,
15 December 1994, p 42.BACK
19. INTERFAX 12 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-239,
13 December 1994, p 18.BACK
20. This aim stretched beyond the region in question
to other contested areas of the former USSR. For example, Vladimir Zhirinovsky
appealed to Yeltsin on 28 November to confirm that "the Black Sea Fleet
belongs to Russia, that Sevastopol is a Russian city, and to state, finally,
that the Crimea is part and parcel of the Russian Federation." See FBIS-SOV-94-235A,
7 December 1994, p 6.BACK
21. In a 13 December 1994 RFE/RL release, Julia Wishnevsky
reported that Yeltsin put before the upper house, the Federal Assembly,
these three rhetorical questions: (1) Should the Russian Federation negotiate
the status of Chechnya as a part of Russia, and is the parliament ready
to introduce into the constitution an amendment on the right of Chechnya
to secede, in view of the possible domino effect this would have on other
secession-minded republics within the Russian Federation? (2) Should Russia
talk to Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev? (Yeltsin reminded parliamentarians
that such a provision would necessitate the State Duma to formally recognize
the 1991 election of Dudayev as president.) (3) Citing a 25 March 1994
State Duma statement on the Chechen problem, which stated the necessity
of free elections as a precondition for talks with the Chechen leadership,
Yeltsin asked the deputies how they would organize free elections in Chechnya
considering the current situation. Sovset, 13 December 1994.BACK
22. The Russian government has been insisting for months
that oil from nearby Azerbaijan's planned $7.4-billion oil project in the
landlocked Caspian Sea should be routed through a pipeline to Russia's
Black Sea port of Novorossiysk for export to the West. Russia's problem
is that the pipeline goes right through the middle of Chechnya. While experts
differ on how great a role the pipeline played in Russia's decision to
invade the oil-rich republic, they agree that it is now a major strategic
prize. CIS news, item 1219K, 19 December 1994.BACK
23. Stepan Kiselyov, Azer Mursaliyev, "Who Stands to
Gain from the Invasion?", Moscow News, December 23-29 December 1994,
No. 51, p 2.BACK
24. Vadim Markushin, "Russia must secure its own flanks,
Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff again voices concern...",
Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 December 1994 p 3, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-236,
8 December 1994, p 15.BACK
25. At a conference in December 1994 Grachev noted
that the military budget of 40.6 trillion rubles covers defense needs by
only one-third. One day of peacekeeping in Abkhazia costs 2 billion rubles,
in Tajikistan one day of the 201st's presence costs 15 billion rules, one
day of joint games under NATO's Partnership for Peace program costs 1 billion
rubles (for a battalion), and downsizing the officer corps by 200,000 men
costs 11-12 million rubles for a colonel, 8-9 million for a major, and
6-7 million for a captain (20 monthly salary payments). The operation in
Chechnya adds to this debt daily. See Victor Yershov, "The Defense Minister
has it in for Everyone," Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta, 9 December
1994 pp 1, 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-238, 12 December 1994 p 34. BACK
26. Ibid., Kiselyov and Mursaliyev.BACK
27. Ibid.BACK
28. Vladimir Socor, RFE/RL 16 December 1994, from Sovset
16 December 1994.BACK
29. Moscow RIA, 29 November 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-235A,
7 December 1994, p 15.BACK
30. Public opinion was very much against the Russian
intervention. A poll from 17 December noted that 73% blamed the Russian
Federation Government for the present crisis situation, 66% blamed the
reformers, mafia, and breakup of the USSR, and 64% blamed Yeltsin for everything.
The poll was conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences. One in nine
were prepared to place the military at the head of the country, and over
one-half count on a strong leader capable of "instilling order in the country."BACK
31. Author's discussion with a Russian general in June,
1994 and cited in Krasnaya Zvesda, 13 July 1994 p 2. The Russian
general noted that Russian criteria was the same as U.S. criteria for using
force in a peacekeeping operation except that "we ask to be invited into
a country and you do not. We will not intervene in a peacekeeping operation
without the consent of both sides."BACK
32. "Appeal of the President of the Russian Federation
B.N. Yeltsin to the Citizens of Russia," Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 December
1994 p 1, as reported in JPRS-UMA-94-055, 21 December 1994, p 31.BACK
33. "Edict of the President of the Russian Federation
on Measures to Stop the Actions of Illegal Armed Formations in the Territory
of the Chechen Republic and in the Zone of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict,"
Krasnaya Zvezda, 14 December 1994, p 1, as reported in JPRS-UMA-94-055,
21 December 1994, p 31.BACK
34. Stepan Kiselyov,"Red Letter Day on the Calendar,"
Moscow News, December 16-22, 1994, No. 50, p 2. Zorkin was the head
of the Constitutional Court and Khasbulatov the Speaker of Parliament.BACK
35. Moscow TV 11 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-238,
12 December 1994, p 23.BACK
36. Moscow Russian TV 12 December 1994, as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-239, 13 December 1994 p 16.BACK
37. Vyzhutovich, Ibid.BACK
38. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 20 December 1994 p 1,
as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-246, 22 December 1994, p 23.BACK
39. L'Unita 12 December 1994, as reported in
FBIS-SOV-94-238, 12 December 1994 p 17.BACK
40. ITAR-TASS 12 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-239,
13 December 1994, p 30.BACK
41. Russian TV 0500 GMT 13 December 1994, as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-239, 13 December 1994, p 31.BACK
42. INTERFAX 1810 GMT 12 December 1994, as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-239, 13 December 1994, p 28.BACK
43. Valeriy Yakov, "How Many More Children Must Die
in Chechnya for Moscow to heed Kovalev's Voice?", Izvestiya, 23
December 1994 p 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-247, 23 December 1994, p
12.BACK
44. Vasiliy Kononenko, "Civilian Control of Operation
Eroding," Izvestiya, 15 December 1994, p 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-240,
14 December 1994, p 17.BACK
45. Gleb Cherkasov, "Duma Ad Hoc Headquarters Confident
in Russian Troops' Fighting Spirit and Denies Rumors of Massive Desertions,"
Segodnya, 22 December 1994, p 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-246,
p 29.BACK
46. Aleksandra Lugovskaya, "Operations Center formed
in Government," Rossiyskiye Vesti, 14 December 1994, p 1 as translated
in FBIS-SOV-94-240, pp 15, 16.BACK
47. INTERFAX, 7 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-236,
8 December 1994, p 23.BACK
48. Vladimir Yemelyanenko, "New Vice Premier Stakes
His Position on the Use of Force in the Caucasus," Moscow News,
No. 50 December 16-22 1994, p 4.BACK
49. Vasiliy Kononenko, "Civilian Control of Operation
Eroding," Izvestiya, 15 December 1994, p 2 as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-240,
14 December 1994, p 17.BACK
50. Ibid.BACK
51. Galina Starovoitova, "Reforms Fail Test in Chechnya,"
Moscow News, December 23-29, 1994, No. 51, p 1, 2.BACK
52. INTERFAX 5 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-234,
6 December 1994, p 39.BACK
53. Aleksandr Pelts, "Conflict Zone: Troops Ready to
Act Decisively, but Talks Preferable," Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 December
1994 p 4, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-236, 8 December 1994, p 22.BACK
54. Sergey Bogdanov, "Chechnya: Despite Moscow's Assurances,
Things are Moving Toward Real War," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 December
1994, p 2 as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-241, 15 December 1994, p 52.BACK
55. CIS news, item 1222A, 22 December 1994.BACK
56. ITAR-TASS 1310 22 December 1994, as reported in
FBIS-SOV-94-246, 22 December 1994, p 13.BACK
57. ITAR-TASS 1556 GMT 22 December 1994, as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-247, 23 December 1994, p 11.BACK
58. ITAR-TASS 1443 GMT 21 December 1994, as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-246, 22 December 1994, p 13.BACK
59. CIS news, item 1217 E, 17 December 1994.BACK
60. Julia Wishnevsky, RFE/RL, Sovset, 13 December 1994,
and Vladimir Socor, RFE/RL, "Four Men in a Boat", Sovset, 20 December,
1994.BACK
61. Vladimir Lysenko, "An Authoritarian Regime is Inevitable,"
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 December 1994, pp 1, 2, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-247,
23 December 1994, p 7, 8.BACK
62. CIS news, 1222C, 22 December 1994.BACK
63. INTERFAX 1410 GMT, 23 December 1994 , as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994 p 13.BACK
64.Vladimir Prokhvatilov, "Cost of the War," Komsomolskaya
Pravda, 27 December 1994 (no page given), as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-248,
27 December 1994, p 20. BACK
65. CIS news, 1223G, 23 December 1994.BACK
66. Ostankino TV 29 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-251,
30 December 1994, p 11, 12.BACK
67. See ftn 115.BACK
68. Ibid., p 8, 9.BACK
69. ITAR-TASS 23 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-247,
23 December 1994, p 19, 20.BACK
70. Vladimir Socor, "Spillover Effect in Caucasus,"
Sovset, RFE/RL, 15 December 1994.BACK
71. The term refers to followers of Stephen Bandera,
an anti-Soviet partisan during World War II. In Soviet times, the term
was used to anathematize Ukrainians who fought for Ukraine independence.BACK
72. INTERFAX 1625 GMT 23 December 1994, as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994, p 8.BACK
73. CIS news, item 1219F, 19 December 1994.BACK
74. ITAR-TASS 1425 GMT 26 December 1994, as reported
in FBIS-SOV-94-248, 27 December 1994, p 7.BACK
75. ITAR-TASS 29 December 1994, as reported in FBIS-SOV-94-251,
30 December 1994, p 4.BACK
1996, United States Army, Foreign Military Studies
Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.